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Abstract 
We describe an innovative architecture consisting of trusted security services and 
integrated operating system mechanisms for the protection of distributed multi-domain 
computing environments from malicious code and other attacks. These security services 
and mechanisms extend and interoperate with existing workstations, applications and open 
source operating systems, providing new capabilities for composing secure distributed 
systems using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components. The latter construct results 
from the realization that unless a secure system offers users comfortable and familiar 
interfaces for handling routine information, the secure system will fail due to lack of user 
acceptability. 
1. Introduction 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) computer systems and networks are highly dependent on the security and 
functionality of a National Information Infrastructure that, as currently organized, does not provide adequate defense 
against constant and increasingly sophisticated attacks. As a consequence, we risk corruption of critical data and 
' The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be construed to reflect those of their 
employers or the Department of Defense. This work was supported in part by the MYSEA project of the 
DARPA/ATO CHATS program. 
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systems, leakage of sensitive information, and degradation of service to fundamental defense systems. Industrial 
systems run the risk of economic espionage, while the lack of policy-enabled Joint Command and Control Systems 
constrains military operations. The types of attacks that can be mounted against modem systems range from trivial 
to serious. A synopsis of attacks is illustrated in Table 1. 
Table 1. Attack Elements and System Assurance Required for Defense 
Political Military Long Term Planning Well Funded System Subversion Hiphest 
Malicious Short Term Planning Low to Modest Flaw Exploitation Modest 
Amusement 
To secure mission critical information systems for the DoD and the nation, new trusted computing approaches are 
required, involving both interoperable system security features and standardized security mechanisms. We 
describe an innovative architecture to provide trusted security services and integrated operating system mechanisms 
that can protect distributed multi-domain computing environments from malicious code and other attacks. These 
security services and mechanisms extend and interoperate with existing applications and open source operating 
systems, providing new capabilities for composing secure distributed systems using commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) components, The latter objective results from the realization that unless a secure system offers users 
comfortable and familiar interfaces they use when handling routine information, the secure system will fail due to 
lack of user acceptability. 
The purpose of the Monterey Security Enhanced Architecture (MYSEA, pronounced, m y-  SEE- ah) architecture is to 
provide a trusted distributed operating environment for enforcing multi-domain security policies, which supports 
unmodified COTS productivity applications. The architecture encompasses a combination of many low-assurance 
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1 . An open source trusted path mechanism for assured and unambiguous user communication with the trusted 
commercial components and relatively few specialized (e.g., high-assurance) multi-domain components. This 
arrangement permits the ongoing DoD and U.S. Government investment in commodity personal computer (PC) 
operating systems and applications to be integrated into an environment where enforcement of critical security 
policies is assigned to more trusted elements. Assurance is derived from the application of high assurance system 
design and development methods to the trusted elements as well as to the overall architecture. 
The trusted computing base (TCB) for MYSEA is called the Monterey Secure Architecture Operating System 
(MYSEOS, pronounced, my-SEE -ose). In the MYSEA prototype we have constructed, MYSEOS is based upon a 
security-enhanced version of the OpenBSD operating system. However, the operating system modifications we have 
defined are modular and conceptually simple enough that they could be accomplished on a variety of open source 
platforms (e.g., Linux), while the architecture can support higher assurance TCB components, as well". We also 
provide a mechanism for vertical integration of application security requirements with underlying security services, 
applying an existing Quality of Security Service model and framework [24] to the integrated security structure. 
Additionally, the MYSEA system supports secure trusted path"' communications between the user and the trusted 
4 
0s. 
Several aspects of this research provide innovative advances in the state of the art for protecting multiple domains of 
information and for the management of security policies and security services in support of critical applications. 
Ultimately, the commercial proliferation of these innovations will be available for direct consumption by the DoD 
for use by operational forces as well as for critical national infohation infrastructure systems. Specific innovations 
that we anticipate to be suitable for immediate technical transfer to commercial products are: 
. A distributed architecture for isolating trusted components in support of commercial and open source 
applications. The innovative use of add-on components in commercial client-server systems can 
potentially magnify the impact of trusted open source systems. 
" The use of an unevaluated (and possibly unevaluatable) operating system as the TCB cannot achieve the assurance 
required for the secure management of information having a range of sensitivity levels [33]. 
iii A trusted path provides an unforgeable bidirectional connection between the user and trusted elements of the 
system. 
3 
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computing base. 
Techniques for vertical integration of security policy control functions with underlying security services in 
a Quality of Security Service framework. 
. Single sign-on for access to a community of distributed multi-domain policy servers. Once a user has 
authenticated to MYSEOS, application sessions may be transferred to any confederated MYSEA Server. 
2. Monterey Security Enhanced Architecture 
MYSEA is a distributed client-server architecture featuring a combination of (relatively few) specialized policy 
enforcing components and multiple open source and commercial off-the-shelf components. The major physical 
components of the architecture are illustrated in Figure 1 : 
. Security enhanced servers which provide the locus for security policy enforcement and host various open 
source or commercial application protocol servers, and 
Security enhanced workstations that consist of commercial-class PCs executing popular commercial . 
software products, along with Trusted Path Extensions that provide trustworthy policy support mechanisms 
and thus permit server-enforced security policy to be distributed across the network. 
4 
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Figure 1. Monterey Security Enhanced Architecture (MYSEA) 
The MYSEA Server enforces the security policy and controls access to information. At its heart is a security- 
enhanced version of the OpenBSD operating system (MYSEOS). Application protocol servers run on the trusted 
server and provide services and interfaces to shared resources. When MYSEOS is combined with mtrusted, but 
policy constrained (and, in some instances, policy aware) application protocol servers, the result is the MYSEA 
Server. Each MYSEA workstation is a PC equipped with a Trusted Path Extension device that provides MYSEA 
policy support at the workstation. The MYSEA Server(s) and the Trusted Path Extension(s) are the only components 
directly connected to the physical network. Multiple MYSEA Servers provide scalability within the desired security 
policy perimeter. 
MYSEA Concept of Operation 
Using the Trusted Path Extension at the PC, users log on to the MYSEA system by way of a trusted path, 
establishing an identity for audit and access control purposes, and then establish session properties such as current 
sensitivity level. Subsequently, the user can log on to the native client 0s at the PC and use standard commercial 
client software (e.g., web browser or e-mail program) to access applications supported by the MYSEA Server, or use 
5 
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any applications supported by the local PC. From the PC the user can access any domain of server data allowed by 
the security policy (for example, reading domains of data that are lower in sensitivity that the negotiated session 
level) as well as access local data. By again invoking the trusted path, the user can request to modify session security 
attributes, such as “session level.” During such negotiations, the Trusted Path Extension will ensure that client 
access to the network is blocked. 
MYSEA Components 
The MYSEA system consists of the following hierarchy of components, which are described below. 
. MYSEAServer 
o Policy-aware application protocol servers 
o MYSEOS . trusted path services . Security Support Services . secure session services . quality of security services . cryptographic services . multi-domain open source kernel (MLS-enhanced OpenJ3SD) 
9 MYSEA Workstation 
o Trusted Path Extension 
o COTS PC, including unmodified: . operating system . user interface . application’s . network connections 
MYSEA Server 
Each MYSEA Server consists of MYSEOS, which enforces critical security policy, and assorted untrusted 
application server instances (e.g. one per security domain per user). The actions of the application servers are 
constrained by the policy enforcement mechanisms of MYSEOS. The application servers are functionally equivalent 
in terms of overall application-level protocol support to a COTS application server for the particular protocol 
provided. Thus, each application server is conipatible with existing COTS client packages. Additionally, 
6 
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I 
information managed by application servers can be organized to support such sharing as is allowed by the server, as 
well as advisory labeling. 
MYSEOS (depicted in Figure 2) is built on OpenBSD as a set of kernel enhancements to create labeled protection 
domains and a set of additional security services. The MYSEOS kernel associates security attributes with active and 
passive entities exported at the operating system interface. Enhancements include a protected security manager 
configured to interpret these attributes and enforce policy according to configuration-specific rules. An important 
policy for the MYSEOS kernel to enforce is that malicious code may neither exfiltrate confidentially-sensitive data 
nor corrupt information of higher integrity; to support this, the MYSEOS kernel provides multi-domain file system 
support, which provides for the global and persistent separation of data into its respective domains. Other security 




Figure 2. MYSEA Server 
Trusted Path Services 
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The Trusted Path Services component supports multiple locally attached terminals, as well as multiple remote 
MYSEA workstations. Trusted Path Services maintains the state of the user-to-MYSEA interaction, for example, a 
user may be logged in with default security attributes, but may not have started a session executing untrusted 
application code. Trusted Path Services provides an interface to the Security Support Services component to support 
identification and authentication, negotiation of domain or domain range, password modification, account creation 
and deletion, and user security attribute maintenance. Once a session has been established, the Trusted Path Services 
provides a distributed Session Status Database to the Secure Session Services component. 
Secure Session Services 
The Secure Session Services component is used to launch instances of untrusted, constrained application protocol 
servers. It provides trusted policy-sensitive services, with functionality similar to that of classic inetd 
implementations and supports standard application protocol transmissions. The Secure Session Services accesses the 
Session Status Database, maintained by the Trusted Path component, to determine the security attributes to associate 
with each application protocol server. 
This Session Status Database contains tuples that uniquely identify the user, the client workstation associated with 
the user, the status of the user session, the security attributes of the session, and other security relevant information. 
Through a session status communication mechanism, information in the Session Status Database can be provided to 
distributed multi-policy platforms, thus providing a single sign-on and session level capability. 
Quality of Security Service Support 
MYSEA can be integrated with an external resource or QoS manager to provide a means of dynamically managing 
its security and performance characteristics. The MYSEA QoSS Manager is the external QoSS interface to MYSEA, 
and governs security and performance factors of the various MYSEA components, for example, which application 
protocol servers the client may interact with, and the cryptographic protection characteristics of the underlying 
communication channels. The QoSS security and connectivity database is managed by the QoSS manager on the 
MYSEA server, and is distributed to the Trusted Path Extensions, as needed. 
8 
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The Quality of Security Service manager provides a user interface so that decision makers can request the overall 
security posture of the network. This interface provides the decision maker with a simple set of choices, hiding the 
321. underlying complexity of the quality of security service mechanisms 
Constrained Application Protocol Servers 
The secure session server provides instances of standard protocol servers for each client or for equivalence classes of 
clients. The Session Status Database, which is managed by the trusted path services component, but is readable by 
the secure session server, is used to assign security attributes to protocol servers launched on behalf of a requesting 
client. Thus the protocol servers are associated with domains reflecting the granularity of the policy enforced by the 
underlying trusted operating system. 
Protocol servers take two forms. The. first form is a standard, policy-unaware protocol server, e.g. HTTP. These 
servers are restricted to accessing files and other objects associated only with the particular domain associated with 
the session. The second type of server is policy-aware, e,g, a file system, [22] and is able to take advantage of 
certain security policy domain relations that permit limited modes of access to certain other domains (e.g., "read 
down" for mandatory confidentiality policies). 
Among the application servers we have adapted to the MYSEA environment are: Internet Mail Access Protocol 
(IMAP) based on the University of Washington IMAP server [15], Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HT") based on 
the Apache server [6], and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTF') based upon sendmail [9]..Each server required 
little or no code modification to be adapted to the multilevel environment. With a proper configuration of the policy- 
aware application protocol server, users can view information at or below their current session levels. 
MYSEA Workstations 
Platforms may be considered to be an automated extension of the individual using them. In a network, a user may 
have a client workstation that is being used to access a server across the network. From the simplest point of view, 
the client system can be viewed as containing the following elements: processing services, user interface services, 
and 110 services supporting network communications and storagc. 
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MYSEA workstations consist of two physical components: a Trusted Path Extension and an untrusted personal 
computer (see Figure 3). The PCs are typical COTS products hosting a popular commercial operating system and a 
commercial 'application suite. The application suite contains client software intended to access standard application 
protocol servers. For example, mail service clients might include: Lotus Notes, Outlook, Pine, Postal, and 
Netscape[l7]. A typical browser supports the client interface to web pages. 
To ensure that object reuse requirements are met, workstations are managed to be, in effect, "diskless," with 
sufficient volatile RAM-disk capability to support a wide variety of user applications. The Trusted Path Extension 
satisfies object reuse requirements by ensuring that RAM and other volatile primary and secondary storage are 




Figure 3. MYSEA Workstation 
Trusted Path Extension 
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The trusted elements of the MYSEA system provide the locus of security policy enforcement. Not only do these 
elements provide runtime policy enforcement, but they must also provide services for the enforcement of supporting 
policies. To create a distributed TCB, the architecture includes a Trusted Path Extension at each workstation. 
The Trusted Path Extension maintains its own self-protecting domain that is separate from the user and workstation 
domains. The use of a separate processor for the Trusted Path Extension ensures that it cannot be subverted by 
malicious software on the workstation. Architecturally, the Trusted Path Extension provides the PC’s only access to 
the network. 
The Trusted Path Extension has two form factors: an internal PCI card (planned for future development) and an 
external hand-held computer (per the current MYSEA prototype). In the PCI card format the Trusted Path 
Extension presents a NIC interface to the workstation. User trusted path I/O, including the secure attention key, is 
achieved via strictly controlled access to the PC keyboard and display. In the handheld format, the Trusted Path 
Extension performs IP network address translation for all IP traffic going between the PC and the LAN -- and user 
trusted path I/O occurs via the handheld’s native keyboard and screen. 
Simplicity has been a primary design goal for the Trusted Path Extension. The objective was not to construct a 
second operating system for the PC; it does not require the complexity and rich set of services provided by a typical 
PC (e.g. file system, printers and other peripheral drivers). The Trusted Path Extension can be viewed as a 
minimized embedded system that maintains no state of its own; instead, it functions as a “drone” in response to 
commands from the MYSEA server for controlling the workstation and managing 110 with the user. The Trusted 
Path Extension, under direction from the MYSEA server, supports the following services: 
. Secure Attention Key - this service permits users to initiate unambiguous communication with MYSEOS 
for unspoofable presentation and capture of security critical data at the user interface. The secure attention 
key must cause a state change in the Trusted Path Extension such that an unforgeable communications path 
(viz. a trustedpath) to MYSEOS is established. 
. Trusted Path Services - when the trusted path is invoked, the user may elect to input security critical 
information, such as a password. The trusted path services ensure that prompts from the server are 
displayed and that an input mechanism for replies is available. 
. Controlled LAN Access - provide non-bypassable, controlled access to the LAN from the PC. Malicious 
11 
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software on the PC cannot bypass the Trusted Path. 
Communications and cryptographic services - provide protected communication channels between the 
server and the Trusted Path Extension. These protected communications are based upon protocols that 
w 
support both the establishment and maintenance of a trusted path and session-level communications, such 
as to initiate communication with the server (via the secure attention key), as well as to receive and to 
respond to commands from the MYSEA Server. 
Negotiated Session Services - these mechanisms ensure trusted object reuse at the client PC for both ' 
primary and secondary storage. When a user chooses to change domains, certain policies require that 
information associated with the previous domain be purged from the untrusted PC, e.g. previous session 
information cannot be reused by subsequent sessions in conflict with the distributed security policy. The 
Trusted Path Extension ensures that object reuse requirements are met with each session change and as 
dictated by policy for session level changes. The Trusted Path Extension supports object reuse directives 
issued by MYSEOS. These directives may include both functional and procedural actions at the 
workstation. 
Control of Security Critical Activities -control the client and its resources at the time of boot and control 
security critical actions throughout the client session. 
Quality of Security Service - as networks become more complex and adaptive, it may be necessary to 
provide "security on demand." When conditions on the network change, requirements for security may 
also change. In response to a change notification, quality of security service mechanisms located on the 
Trusted Path Extension can modify the protection services afforded an ongoing session. The selection of 
protection mechanisms for communications between the client and the server may be based upon network 
conditions such as INFOCON mode. A version of IPSec adapted to provide automated, dynamic Quality of 
Security Service through the use of an enhanced version of a policy server such as Keynote [7]permits 
selection of protection mechanisms for MYSEA Servers. 
3. MYSEA Developmental Assurance 
Our rigorous security engineering and development process [25] is intended to support high assurance evaluation of 
(portions of) the finished product. Development begins with the capture of the security policy to be enforced and an 
interpretation of that policy in terms of an abstract computer system. This may produce a formal security policy 
12 
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model and subsequent evidence that policy enforcement objectives are met. In parallel with that formal approach, 
the engineering team develops a series of specifications that ranges from threat model and high level requirements to 
detailed implementation documents and code. A system requirements specification for a secure system incorporates 
security considerations in conjunction with all other requirements. 
I User access to multi-domain data via commercial workstations and applications 
Starting with a threat model and a system requirements specification, we develop a system architecture. From these, 
we develop functional specifications for specific components, such as the protection module of the distributed 
trusted OS, and a corresponding detailed design specification for those same components. Concurrent development 
of requirements, functional, and design specification allow us to identify notions that are generalizable and can be 
abstracted for inclusion in the higher-level documents. Conversely, detailed items more appropriate for the lower- 
level specification can be moved down. This iterative feedback approach permits us to develop documents suitable 
for evolutionary engineering processes [5][3 11 as experiential or environmental factors lead to requirements for new 
versions of the system. 
, 
The research defined in this paper builds on a variety of previous efforts. The primary work we are extending is 
from the MLS LAN project [2][4][10][11][12][15][17][20][23][36][44]. This previous project resulted in 
development of networking modules to support the following functions: (1) a trusted path between client 
workstations and the server, (2) session-level negotiation at the server from the client workstations, and (3) secure 
single-level session communications on the Ethernet for client workstations at different session levels (i.e., different 
domains communicate with the server through a single physical network device). In the MYSEA project, we have 
adapted and extended the fundamental research underlying these concepts and provided prototype demonstrations of 
the integrated concepts in an open-source environment. 
Hinke suggested the notion of a high assurance server to provide a locus of multi-domain control to single level 
clients [ t l ] .  In that design sketch, clients were relegated to a single level and were connected to the multilevel server 
via single level network links. Although this architecture may be useful in certain static situations, it does not 
13 
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provide the flexibility inherent in the MYSEA design. By restricting the client to a single level throughout its 
lifetime, users are required to access multiple clients in order to manipulate information at several levels. In contrast 
to this approach, the MYSEA architecture allows clients to renegotiate session levels. 
Rushby and Randell [38] describe a design for a distributed secure system that utilizes “trusted network interface 
units” (TNIUs) to connect workstations at different access classes to a local area network, through which access to a 
distributed multilevel file server is provided. Identification and authentication of users, as well as session level 
negotiation via the TNIUs is also described. Over and above this functionality, the MYSEA architecture also 
allows a more general purpose client-server operating environment, whereby new application servers can be easily 
added to the system, and thin clients may also be easily supported. 
Replication architectures [ 181 provide a simple technique to achieve near-term multilevel security by copying all 
information at low security levels to all dominating levels. On a small scale, one can expect them to work rather 
well; on a large scale, in terms of both numbers of documents to be replicated and numbers of security levels to be 
replicated to, their usefulness is rather problematic. The preponderance of information used in the DoD today is 
either unclassified or designated sensitive but unclassified (SBU). Replication of this large amount of data to all 
higher levels seems infeasible. In the commercial sector, the ratio of proprietary to less sensitive information is 
similar. The MYSEA multi-domain solution does not utilize replication as a fundamental mechanism, so it avoids 
these problems. 
Various virtual machine monitor approaches have been suggested [8][28][3] for supporting COTS applications 
while reliably separating different domains of data. In general, for these approaches to be trustworthy requires both 
the use of hardware that is strictly virtualizable [19], and a trustworthy monitor mechanism for separating the 
activities of the virtual machines. Creating a monitor that is trusted enough to both separate different domains of 
activity, and allow read-down to less sensitive domains (as does MYSEA) is all the more difficult. While [28] was 
designed to provide high assurance read-down capabilities, the effort was cancelled for lack of commercial support. 
The VMM approach continues to be problematic for separation of different domains of data because many current 
microprocessors are not strictly virtualizable [35], leading to complex software solutions, and because of the 
difficulty of creating a trusted monitor. 
14 
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Non-distributed approaches to supporting access to multi-domain data via COTS applications have been proposed in 
the Seaview project [ 13][30], the "Purple Pennelope" project [34], and some VMM architectures (see above). In 
each of thesk approaches, a separate process is created for each security level. Purple Pennelope has limited 
assurance, as it runs as a user-level application, and it does not support a modifiable session level. The others are 
supported by an underlying reference validation mechanism that controls access to multi-domain data. The MYSEA 
project extends certain concepts from these projects into a distributed environment. 
The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) Network Pump [26] was developed to allow messages from a system 
operating in a low security domain to be sent to a system operating in a high security domain, and to prohibit 
messages and other information from going in the reverse direction. Additionally, the NRL Pump has been proposed 
as part of an overall network architecture to provide a more general two-way connectivity between multiple subnets 
at different security levels, resulting in a multiple single-level (MSL) network [27]. In this approach, information is 
also processed by an automated filter-guard to allow policy-approved information to flow from higher domains to 
lower domains. The MSL network approach has several drawbacks that the MYSEA avoids: 
, 
The capital and administrative cost of separately maintained local area networks (LANs) 
The technical challenge of providing an automatic and reliable information filtering mechanism 
The cost of maintaining filtering rules for changing policies (e.g., the policy may evolve as administrators 
become aware of different threats) 
The technical challenge of filtering complex information structures, such as multimedia. 
The Starlight project [ I ]  was designed to support logically separate single-level workstations connected by a switch 
to data management subsystems at different (single) levels. Software associated with the switch ensures that the 
current level of the workstation matches the level of data subsystem indicated by the switch setting. Starlight also 
allows low confidentiality information to flow through the switch to high sessions, providing a "read-down" 
capability. This approach has the same basic drawbacks as the MSL network, described above. 
Novel1 Trusted Workstation Partnership [ 161 defined a network architecture for separating clients in different 
security domains with their Class C2 evaluated network software. An instantiation of this approach utilized the 
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Sistex, Inc., Assure EC plug-in card to separate the different file system domains, however, this product is no longer 
marketed, and detailed documentation is not available. 
Other Open Source Multi-Domain Variations 
The "rule set based access control'" (RSBAC) system [37] is a Linux extension wherein all security relevant system 
calls are routed through a central decision component. Access-control decisions are based on the type of access and 
on attributes attached to the calling subject and to the target to be accessed. The robustness and security 
characteristics of this implementation are not clear from the documentation [ 1 11. 
The Safe Areas of Compptation project from the University of Santa Barbara [ 141 defines a distributed architecture 
~ 
to support secure access to multiple data domains. In this approach, a trusted component on each client and server 
I platform is responsible for the access control decisions of that platform. The trusted component is assisted by an 
I untrustedhnprotected communication package that manages metadata exchange with the corresponding (reciprocal) 
I client or server, and participates in encryption, decryption and key management activities. For client platforms, it is 
I envisioned that the access control component can be implemented in a smart card. This approach requires 
I modification to client applications to interact with the communications package, so it does not meet requirements for 
, 
I use with MYSEA systems. The communications package may also be a vulnerable point of attack, with regard to 
I cryptographic processing. 
The Security-Enhanced Linux project from the NSA has recently released some information regarding their 
approach to controlling multiple information domains in an open source operating system [29] [40]. From a 
preliminary examination of these papers, it appears that the Security-Enhanced Linux project has not yet defined 
several mechanisms that are planned for MYSEA: 
. Remote-client login to the trusted 0s 
. Trusted path communications with the trusted 0s 
. Changing a user session security level 
A mechanism for assigning security-domain context to a newly received network connection 
. Trusted, rather than client, support for IPsec message labeling. 
16 
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. Support for untrusted clients, i.e., clients who are not based on Security-Enhanced Linux. 
Trusted Path 
"Trusted path" refers to mechanisms that provide assurance that security-critical functions are provided by the "real" 
system rather than masquerading software. Several commercial systems have implemented trusted path mechanisms, 
including Windows NT [42], Trusted Solaris 7[41], and the XTS-300 [43]. In the case of NT and Solaris, it is 
notable that the processing of security requests is handled, at least partially, outside of the kernel, so the assurance of 
request handling is of some question. 
5. Conclusion 
We have presented the Monterey Security Enhanced Architecture (MYSEA), which provides a trusted distributed 
operating environment for enforcing multi-domain security- policies, and which supports unmodified COTS 
productivity applications. The architecture encompasses a combination of many (untrusted) commercial 
components and relatively few trusted multi-domain components. Our prototype implementation utilizes a security- 
enhanced version of the OpenBSD operating system, called MYSEOS, as the policy enforcing trusted computing 
base (TCB). The architecture is general enough that it would easily accommodate a high assurance TCB, as well. 
MYSEA introduces several innovations for protecting multiple data domains and for managing security policies and 
security services in support of critical applications,' including: 
. A distributed trusted architecture that utilizes commercial and open source applications to access multiple 
data domains. 
An open source trusted path mechanism. 
Techniques for vertical integration of security policy control functions with underlying security services. 
Single sign-on for access to a community of distributed multi-domain policy servers. 
' 
. 
In the future, we plan several additions and enhancements to MYSEA. We have begun investigation of a ring 
mechanism[39] for open source operating systems, to help constrain the behavior of applications that run on 
MYSEOS and similar environments. ' 
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There are various systems and tools available to support the automated verification of computer system behavior. 
As a precursor to the formal analysis of the security behavior of MYSEA components, we have received support to 
perform a survey of available formal verification tools. That survey was started this summer. 
We have recently started a project that includes the development of a very high assurance micro kernel. The goal 
for the Trusted Computing Exemplar Project is to provide a worked example of a high assurance system that can be 
used by the education community, government and industry. To further that aim, we plan to make the micro kernel, 
its development methodology and its evaluation evidence generally available through open source methods. As an 
early example of the application of the high assurance micro kernel, we plan to implement a high assurance Trusted 
Path Extension. 
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